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WTO entry in 2001 heralded a new stage in the reform of China’s banking sector. With the 
reality that foreign banks would be extended national treatment by the end of 2006, China’s 
banks faced the imperative to reform in earnest. They began reforms from a variety of 
different starting points and have pursued a variety of different reform approaches. Five 
years on, this paper assesses efficiency levels in 11 of China’s most prominent banks. The 
results, obtained using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), suggest that differences in 
efficiency levels are actually quite small. On the one hand, this finding is encouraging 
because it suggests that few of China’s major banks lag behind the pack. On the other hand, 
it also implies that efficiency levels almost certainly do lag in China’s less prominent banks, 
which together still account for more than 40 per cent of total banking system assets.   
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The reform of China’s banking sector has lagged behind that of other sectors of the 
economy. In contrast to the manufacturing sector, during the 1980s and 1990s foreign 
investment in China’s banking sector was barred and domestic banks were protected from 
competition with foreign entrants. China’s largest banks were also wholly state-owned and 
operated as quasi-fiscal entities that made loans according to government policy directives 
rather than commercial considerations. These stylized facts contributed to a highly 
inefficient banking sector (Lardy 1998) that was described by The Economist (1998, 65) as 
being “the worst in Asia”. WTO entry in 2001 heralded a new stage of reform in China’s 
banking sector. Most significantly, as part of its WTO accession agreement the Chinese 
government committed to extending national treatment to foreign banks by the end of 
2006. At the time this commitment was made, there was considerable concern expressed 
within China regarding whether domestic banks would be able to transform themselves 
into viable competitors within the five-year transitional period. Xu and Li (2007, 885) 
offered the dire prediction that, "The only way to avoid a banking crisis in the short run it 
seems is more government bailouts in the name of financial stability and social harmony. 
Others, such as Bonin and Huang (2002) and Leung and Chan (2006), reached more 
sanguine conclusions, emphasizing, for example, the competitive advantages that accrue to 
domestic banks from having an established customer base and a comprehensive branch 
network. Whether foreign bank entry undermines the solvency of domestic banks or not, 
there can be no doubt that their presence has greatly increased the pressure on China’s 
banks to become more efficient. Incumbents have also faced increased competition from 
new domestic banks. In the mid-1980s, China’s banking sector consisted of a simple 
two-tiered structure with the People’s Bank of China (PBC) as the central bank, and four 
large, wholly state-owned banks that each focused on a specific sector the economy – the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China (BOC), China 
Construction Bank (CCB) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). Together, the “big four” 
held more than 90 per cent of total banking sector assets (Laurenceson and Chai 2003).   2
Since this time the big four have been joined by more than 10 nation and region-wide joint 
stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and more than 100 City Commercial Banks (CCBs). As 
shown in Table 1, at the end of 2007 the big four, plus the Bank of Communications 
(BOCOM), China’s fifth largest bank, accounted for only 53.2 per cent of total banking 
sector assets. In 2007, 31 of China’s banks were included in The Banker’s annual listing of 
the world’s 1000 largest commercial banks.  
 
Table 1. Institutional Structure of China’s Banking Sector, 2007 
 Total   
(RMB 
millions) 
Big 4 + 
BOCOM 
JSCBs CCBs  Other  banks
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1. Other banks include policy banks, rural commercial banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives, and postal 
savings, amongst others. 
Source – China Banking Regulatory Commission 
 
China’s banks have begun to reform from a variety of different starting points and have 
pursued a variety of different reform approaches. For example, in terms of starting points, 
on the one hand, the big four have suffered from a legacy of being wholly state-owned and 
operated as quasi-fiscal institutions. On the other hand, relative to China’s other banks, 
they had the advantage of having a large and established customer base and extensive 
branch networks. The ICBC, BOC and CCB have also been the recipients of large central 
government-sponsored injections of fresh capital and have had large chunks of their 
non-performing assets transferred to Asset Management Companies (AMCs) created 
specifically for that purpose (Fung and Ma 2006; Ma 2007). Meanwhile, the reform 
program of the ABC has yet to be defined or instigated. While China’s other banks have 
faced less historical government interference in their operations, and some such as China 
Minsheng Bank (CMSB) have even been majority non-state owned, they have also 
benefited less from scale economies and have received less direct government support. In 
terms of reform approaches, some, starting with the Bank of Shanghai in 2001, have sought 
to become more efficient by taking on foreign investment (Leigh and Podpiera 2006). As 
part of its WTO accession agreement, the Chinese government also agreed to permit   3
minority foreign investment in China’s banks. Current regulations permit a single foreign 
investor to hold up to a 20 per cent stake in a Chinese bank, and total foreign investment 
can reach a maximum of 25 per cent. Other domestic banks, such as Shenzhen Commercial 
Bank in 2006, have raised fresh capital by selling equity to other domestic institutions. 
Others still, such as China Merchants Bank (CMB) in 2002, have raised capital through a 
public listing on either the Shanghai and / or Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
 
This paper analyses efficiency levels in 11 of China’s most prominent banks five years 
after WTO entry and the imperative to reform began in earnest.  Unfortunately, the 
efficiency of China’s major banks cannot be benchmarked against foreign banks operating 
in China, which might be taken to represent best international efficiency practice, because 
foreign banks only began incorporating in China at the end of 2006 and so separate data for 
their Chinese operations are not yet available. Nonetheless, benchmarking China’s major 
banks against one another still serves to answer a number of important questions. In 
particular, have the different starting points and different approaches to reform led to large 
differences in efficiency amongst these banks today? If yes, which banks are the least 
efficient and most vulnerable to rising levels of competition? Also, if there are large 
differences in efficiency levels, are common characteristics observable amongst the more 
efficient banks, such as the presence of foreign investors? Alternatively, has the common 
imperative that all banks have faced to reform led to a convergence in their relative 
efficiency levels, despite the variation in starting points and reform paths taken?  
 
Section two of this paper reviews the existing literature that discusses efficiency levels of 
amongst China’s banks and highlights the knowledge gaps that remain. Section three 
describes the methodology we use in this paper to analyze efficiency levels, as well as the 
data we use to perform our empirical investigation. Section four presents the empirical 
findings. Section five makes concluding comments.  
 
2. Literature review 
This study is not the first to consider efficiency levels in China’s banks. Existing studies 
can be divided into three basic categories.    4
 
The first category uses interviews with industry participants to arrive at perceptions of 
efficiency. For example, PWC (2007, 15) asked CEOs and Senior Executives at 40 foreign 
banks operating in China to rank the competitiveness, a proxy for efficiency, of various 
domestic banks according to their own perceptions. The top three domestic banks 
nominated were BOC, ICBC and CMB. The report acknowledges, “These views are 
recognized as being very subjective but they nevertheless reflect a degree of differentiation 
in the minds of the foreign bankers interviewed.   
 
The second category tries to take a less subjective approach by using common accounting 
ratios to infer efficiency levels. For example, Shimuzu (2005) uses a variety of accounting 
ratios such as the cost-income ratio, the non-performing loan ratio, the capital adequacy 
ratio and the return on assets to devise a list of China’s best performing banks for the 
consideration of potential foreign investors. In its annual rankings of the world’s 1000 
largest commercial banks, The Banker’s stated preferred measure of efficiency is the 
cost-income ratio. According to this measure, ICBC was China’s most efficient bank at the 
end of 2006 with a cost-income ratio of 36.3 per cent. Bank of Ningbo (BON) and CMB 
closely followed. The least efficient amongst the 31 Chinese banks included in the list was 
CMSB, which had a cost-income ratio of 58.74 per cent. The problem with accounting 
ratios, as observed by O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002), is that they are only 
partial productivity measures. That is, they fail to comprehensively relate a banking firm’s 
inputs and outputs and, as a result, while a given bank may appear to be performing poorly 
based on one measure, it may appear to be doing well based on another. The case of CMSB 
is illustrative. While it ranked last according to the cost-income ratio, it ranked near the top 
according the non-performing loan (NPL) and in the middle of the pack according to the 
return on assets. Based on a large sample of Chinese banks over the years 2001-2006, 
Laurenceson and Qin (2008) showed that the correlation coefficient amongst such partial 
efficiency measures was close to zero and this made them of little practical use for deriving 
overall efficiency rankings.  
 
The third category uses frontier analysis, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and   5
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), to generate more complete efficiency measures. These 
techniques begin with the specification of a model that defines the banking firm’s major 
inputs and outputs. Observed data for these inputs and outputs are then collected for a 
sample of firms. DEA, the technique we use in this paper, then uses linear programming to 
generate a frontier of best practice, or efficiency, from amongst these firms (discussed in 
more detail below). Where a particular firm lies relative to this frontier then determines its 
own efficiency score. Studies to have employed frontier analysis in the case of China’s 
banking sector include Chen et al. (2005), Fu and Heffernan (2007), Kumbhakar and Wang 
(2007) and Berger et al (2007). By seeking to comprehensively relate a bank’s inputs and 
outputs all of these studies adopt a theoretically more rigorous approach to efficiency 
measurement than those that have used simple accounting ratios. Nonetheless, a number of 
shortcomings remain. Chief amongst these is that the above studies use relatively old data 
sets and thus shed little light on current efficiency levels. This is significant when it is 
recalled that reforms in China’s banking sector only began in earnest in 2001. For example, 
Chen et al. (2005) considered the period from 1993-2000, Fu and Heffernan (2007) the 
period from 1985-2002, Kumbhakar and Wang (2007) from 1993-2002 and Berger et al. 
(2007) from 1994-2003. Secondly, all of the above studies present their results in terms of 
groups of banks, such as the big four or JSCBs, rather than in terms of individual banks. 
This approach might mask important variations in efficiency within a particular group. 
Finally, data for China’s banks in popular databases such as Bankscope have previously 
only been available in highly aggregated form and this necessitated the use of relatively 
coarse frontier analysis models. For example, Chen et al. (2005) acknowledge the DEA 
model they use is less than ideal by including just two inputs - interest expenses, reflecting 
the input of leveraged funds, and non-interest expenses, reflecting the use of all other 
inputs. In 2008, this data constraint has been relaxed somewhat and for most of China’s 
major banks it is now possible to assemble data for their three most significant inputs - 
leveraged funds, capital and labour.  
 
3. Methodology 
DEA, the analytical technique we use in this paper, can generate efficiency scores 
pertaining to different types of efficiency, including scale efficiency (SE), technical   6
efficiency, allocative efficiency (AE) and cost efficiency (CE). It is worthwhile briefly 
explaining each of these on a conceptual level and how DEA arrives at an efficiency score 
for each. The following discussion is taken from O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen 
(2002). Figure 1 shows a variable returns to scale (VRS) production frontier, OX, that 
relates a single input, x, and a single output, y. It is described as a VRS frontier because the 
slope, or average product, 
x
y
, changes along the frontier. The increasing returns to scale 
section (i.e., where average product is increasing) and the decreasing returns to scale 
section (i.e., where average product is decreasing) are denoted by OE and EX, respectively. 
In special cases, a production frontier may exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS) and an 
example of this is the frontier OM. Since average product does not change along a CRS 
frontier, all points along it can be considered equally scale efficient. However, with respect 
to the VRS frontier, it can be seen that the point of highest productivity is to be found at 
point E. While firms operating at points D and G are also on the frontier, only the firm 
operating at point E can be considered as operating at the optimal scale. This leads to scale 
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While only the firm operating at point E is scale efficient, firms operating at points D, E 
and G can all be considered technically efficient in that it is impossible for any of them to 
reduce their input usage and maintain their current level of output. The firm operating at 
point H, however, cannot be considered technically efficient because, theoretically, it 
could reduce its input usage by IL without reducing its output. This observation leads to the 









1 = − =          ( 2 )  
 
Note that technical efficiency is measured relative to the production frontier. The firm 
operating at point G is considered technically efficient because it lies on the VRS frontier.   7
However, if the production frontier was in fact the CRS frontier, OM, the technical 
efficiency of the firm operating at point G would be measured relative to point F and it 
would be considered technically inefficient because OK/OL < 1. Note that OK/OL is also 
the scale efficiency of the firm operating at point G by (1). This means that scale efficiency 
can also be calculated by dividing a CRS measure of technical efficiency by a 
corresponding VRS measure.  
 
Technical efficiency can also be discussed in a multiple-output, multiple-input framework, 
and presenting it in this manner better facilitates a discussion of allocative efficiency. 
Figure 2 shows a two-input, single output production technology. The isoquant SS’ shows 
the different input combinations that can produce a given output level, y. Any point on this 
isoquant is technically efficient because it is not possible to reduce the two inputs 
proportionately and maintain the same level of output. In contrast, a firm operating at point 
A cannot be considered technically efficient because, theoretically, both inputs could be 
reduced proportionately by the distance AB without any reduction in output. This leads to 
the technically inefficiency of this firm in percentage terms being defined as the ratio AB / 









1 = − =          ( 3 )  
 
Allocative efficiency deals with the challenge that firms face in selecting an input mix that 
minimizes the cost of producing a given level of output. In Figure 2, the isocost line WW’ 
shows all the combinations of inputs x1 and x2 that yield the same cost. Thus, on the 
isoquant SS’, the firm operating at point R is not only technically efficient but is also 
minimizing cost.  The cost of inputs at R is the same as at point C and this is less than at 
points B and A. This leads to the allocative inefficiency of the firm operating at point A in 
percentage terms being defined as BC/OB. Alternatively, the allocative efficiency of this 









1 = − =          ( 4 )    8
 
The final efficiency concept, cost efficiency, can simply be defined as the product of a 
rm’s technical and allcoative efficiency scores.  
Westhuizen (2002, 4), “A firm is said to 
e scale efficient if it operates on a scale that maximizes productivity, technically efficient 
cient.  




In short, as summarized by O’donnell and van der 
b
if it produces a given set of outputs using the smallest possible amount of inputs, 
allocatively efficient if it selects an input mix that minimizes the cost of producing this 
given set of outputs, and cost efficient if it is both technically and allocatively effi
 
The objective of frontier analysis is essentially to estimate production frontiers such as 
is
The way DEA does this is by using linear programming to find a set of linear segments th
bound, or envelop, the observed data. For example, Figure 3 takes the observed data for the 
firms operating at points M, R and A in Figure 2 and depicts the frontier VV’ that would be 
estimated by DEA frontier. We leave our discussion of the different types of efficiency and 
DEA at this conceptual level. Those readers seeking more technical detail, such as the 
specifics of the linear programs that DEA uses to generate the frontier, we refer to excellent 
sources such as Coelli et al. (2005).   
   9
Figure 1. Single-input, single-output production technology 
 








Source -  O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002) 
 
Figure 2 Two-input, single-output production technology 
 
 
Source -  O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002) 
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Source -  O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen (2002) 
 
In defining the inputs and outputs of the banking firm we take inspiration from the 
intermediaton approach (see Sealey and Lindley 1977), which views a bank principally as 
an intermediary that facilitates the transfer of funds from surplus agents to deficit agents. 
Banks accumulate leveraged funds, such as deposits and money marketing borrowings, 
and in combination with other inputs, such as capital and labour, transform these into 
outputs such as loans, securities investments and other outputs that earn non-interest 
income, such as transactions. Consistent with this approach, the outputs, inputs and input 
prices used in our model are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  DEA Model 
Output quantities  Input quantities  Input prices 
y1 – Loans (net) and other 
earning assets 
y2 – Loans plus deposits 
x1 – Deposits  w1 – interest expenses / x1 
x2 – Number of employees  w2 - personnel expenses / x2 
x3 - Fixed assets value / w3  w3 – fixed asset price index 
 
 
While most outputs, inputs and input prices are self-explanatory, a few warrant additional 
comment. The first output variable, y1, expresses loan volume in net rather than gross terms.   11
Loans (net) is equal to total customer loans minus loan loss reserves. For example, in 2007 
ICBC had total customer loans of RMB4073 billion and loan loss reserves of RMB116 
billion that were being set aside to offset RMB112 billion of problem loans. Thus, its loans 
(net) was RMB3957 billion. Using loans (net) follows Grigorian and Manole (2006) who 
undertook a similar study to ours in the context of Eastern and Central European 
transitional economies. These authors make the point that it is important to recognize 
output quality as an important objective of the reforming banks in these countries. The 
second output variable, y2, loans plus deposits, follows O’Donnell and van der Westhuizen 
(2002). This output aims to measure the production of outputs that banks produce that earn 
non-interest income such as transactions and guarantees. Thus, an assumption is being 
made that the quantity of these outputs is proportional to bank size, a proxy of which is 
loans plus deposits. The first input, x1, deposits, is assumed to be the bank’s only source of 
leveraged funds. While this may not be appropriate in the case of banks operating in OECD 
countries that have ready access to money markets of various types, it is reasonable in the 
case of China. For example, in 2007 deposits accounted for 93.2 per cent of ICBC’s total 
liabilities. In contrast, money market funding only accounted for 2.6 per cent. The third 
input, x3, which seeks to account for the capital input, must be inferred. The only data series 
we have available to us is the value of fixed assets and a fixed asset price index. The 
indirect approach to index number construction is based on the premise that a value change 
can be decomposed into the product of a price change (i.e., a price index) and a quantity 
change (i.e., a quantity index). Thus, a quantity index for capital can then be inferred by 
dividing the value of fixed assets by the price index.   
 
To estimate the above DEA model, we use pooled data for 2005, 2006 and 2007 taken from 
11 of China’s most prominent banks (see below). Using DEA terminology, pooling data 
permits us a total of 33 decision-making units (DMUs). Pedraja-Chaparro et al. (1999) note 
that a common rule of thumb used by DEA practioners is that the number of DMUs should 
be at least three times the number of outputs plus inputs. Others are more cautious 
preferring five times. Ours is more than six times. The banks in our sample were selected 
on the basis that they had published data for each of the above years at the level of 
disaggregation required by our model. The sample is representative of the institutional   12
structure of China’s banking sector in that it includes three of the big four (ICBC, BOC and 
CCB), six JSCBs (BOCOM, CMB, CMSB, China CITIC Bank (CCITICB), Huaxia Bank 
(HX) and Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB)) and two CCBs (Bank of Beijing (BOB) 
and BON). In 2007, these 11 banks accounted for 53 per cent of the total assets of the 
banking system. If China’s three policy banks – China Development Bank (CDB), 
Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and China Exim Bank (CEB) - are excluded from 
the total, and this seems reasonable given that these banks largely do not compete in the 
retail market
1, the share of the 11 banks in our sample rises to nearly 60 per cent. The banks 
included in the sample also allow strong inferences to be made regarding the efficiency of 
those not included. For example, amongst the big four, ICBC, BOC and CCB have all 
undergone extensive reform programs. If these banks do not lie on or near the efficiency 
frontier, the other member of the big four, the ABC, for which data is not available and 
which has yet to undergo a comprehensive reform program, almost certainly will not. 
Similarly, BOB is China’s largest CCB, operating in one of the country’s most prosperous 
localities, and it has embarked on an extensive reform program that sees foreign investors 
holding the maximum equity stake that current regulations permit. Thus, if BOB is found 
to be relatively inefficient, it can safely be concluded that most of China’s other 100-plus 
CCBs will be even less so. All data are taken from the Bankscope database with the 
exception of the fixed asset price index, which comes from China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics. Descriptive data for the variables in our model pertaining to the banks in the 
sample are presented in Table 3.  
 


















Mean 2096583  2964242  1893548  32477  12183  25810  93154 
Std. Dev.  2524553  3517641  2304329  39032  15936  32729  131204 
Maximum 8466672  11671687 7714145 132822  54899  94421  381713 
Minimum 41206 51940 32648  491  264  753  1183 
Observations  33 33 33 33 33  33 33 
Notes –  
                                                 
1 This is likely to change in the future. In February 2008, CDB, the largest policy bank, received government 
approval to begin reforms that aim to transform it into a commercial bank.    13
1. All data is in units of RMB millions with the exception of Employees 
 
 
The DEA software package, DEAP Version 2.1 (Coelli 1996), is used to generate measures 
of SE, TE, AE and CE for each DMU, i.e., for each bank in each year. The average 
efficiency score in 2005, 2006 and 2007 for each bank is then taken as that bank’s overall 
efficiency score. We estimate the model assuming variable returns to scale because there 




The DEA results are presented in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. DEA Results 
SE
1 TE AE CE 
HXB  1.000   BON  1.000  BON  1.000  BON  1.000 
SDB  1.000  SDB  1.000  SDB  1.000  SDB  1.000 
BOC  0.994 
(drs) 
ICBC  0.999  CCB  0.999  ICBC  0.998 
CCITICB  0.989 
(drs) 
CMSB  0.998  ICBC  0.999  CCB  0.996 
BOB  0.982 
(irs) 
BOC  0.997  CMSB  0.992  CMSB  0.990 
CMSB  0.981 
(drs) 
HXB  0.997  BOC  0.992  BOC  0.989 
BOCOM  0.972 
(drs) 
CCB  0.996  HXB  0.987  HXB  0.984 
CCB  0.957 
(drs) 
CMB  0.991  BOCOM  0.986  BOCOM  0.965 
ICBC  0.945 
(drs) 
BOCOM  0.979  CCITICB  0.981  CMB  0.960 
CMB  0.943 
(drs) 
CCITICB  0.978  CMB  0.969  CCITICB  0.959 
BON  0.942 
(irs) 
BOB  0.953  BOB  0.843  BOB  0.803 
Note –  
1. Aside from presenting the scale efficiency score, we also indicate whether the bank was operating in 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRTS) section of the production frontier. 
 
The SE scores show that mid-size banks in our sample, HX and SDB, were found to be the   14
most scale efficient. It is not surprising that the smallest bank, BON, was found to be lying 
in the IRS section of the production frontier and receives the lowest SE score. We caution 
against interpreting this finding as evidence that BON has been mismanaged.  Current 
regulations permit CCBs to only open branches in their city’s boundaries and this will have 
an obvious impact on the scale economies they are able to achieve. It is also important to 
note that while BON is small by the standards of our sample, it is not small by the standards 
of China’s CCBs more generally. Thus, this result implies that the scale at which most of 
China’s CCBs are operating is even more inefficient. The results also suggest that being 
big is not necessarily better. The largest bank in our sample, ICBC, is found to be lying in 
the DRS section of the production frontier and exhibits an SE score only marginally higher 
than BON. Overall, however, differences in SE scores are quite modest. This means that 
the banks in our sample display close to constant returns to scale.    
 
With respect to TE scores, all banks are found to be operating at or close to the frontier. 
BOB has the lowest TE score at 0.953. This score implies that BOB could reduce the 
quantity of inputs it uses by 4.9 per cent without reducing its outputs. Thus, there is scope 
for BOB to improve its technically efficiency, but not by a lot. With BON lying on the 
frontier, there is no suggestion that being a CCB necessarily negatively impacts on the 
ability to achieve technical efficiency.  
 
With respect to AE scores, again, all banks are found to be operating at close to the frontier, 
with the exception of BOB. An AE score of 0.843 implies that BOB could produce the 
same level of output at 15.7 per cent less cost through changing its input mix. The product 
of its TE and AE scores generate a CE score of 0.803, the lowest in our sample, implying 
that it could, theoretically, produce the same level of output at 19.7 percent less cost by 
becoming both technically and allocatively efficient. This finding suggests that BOB has 
the potential to become significantly more cost efficient, a key determinant of 
competitiveness. The second lowest ranked bank, CCITICB, has a CE score of 0.959. This 
implies that it only has the scope to produce its current level of output at 4.1 percent less 
cost.  
   15
To be sure, in an increasingly competitive environment all potential cost savings are 
important. Nonetheless, the general conclusion from our results is that despite beginning 
from different starting points and taking different reform paths, the common imperative 
that all banks have had to reform and improve their efficiency has seemingly led to a 
convergence in their efficiency levels. We caution that this finding should not be taken as 
evidence that there has been a convergence in efficiency levels amongst China’s banks 
more generally. The banks that formed our sample were chosen for reasons of data 
availability, and the mere fact that they have published data on their operations in a 
relatively disaggregated manner likely says much about their sophistication vis-à-vis other 
domestic banks. If we were able to include other banks such as the ABC and some of the 
smaller CCBs in our analysis, the variation in SE, TE, AE and CE scores would almost 
certainly be much greater. Still, amongst the banks in our sample, the variation in 
efficiency levels is quite small. DEA studies conducted in the context of the banking 
sectors of other countries (e.g., Berger and Humphrey 1997) typically show average 
efficiency scores in the order of 0.7-0.9.  
 
5. Conclusion 
WTO entry was a watershed event in the evolution of China’s banking sector. By 
committing to extend national treatment to foreign banks after a five-year transitional 
period, the Chinese government greatly increased the imperative for China’s banks to 
reform and become more efficient. China’s banks are a heterogeneous mix that began to 
reform from a variety of different starting points and they have taken a variety of different 
paths. This paper assessed efficiency levels amongst 11 of China’s most prominent banks 
five years after WTO entry. In particular, it sought to determine whether the variety of 
starting points and reform path approaches taken has led to large variations in efficiency 
levels, or alternatively, whether the common imperative that all banks have faced to 
improve their efficiency levels has promoted a relative convergence in efficiency levels? 
The empirical results lend strong support to the second hypothesis. With the exception of 
BOB, none of the banks in our sample appeared significantly less efficient than any of the 
others. This is an encouraging finding in the sense that our sample comprised nearly all of 
China’s most prominent banks that together account for more than half of total banking   16
sector assets. However, by way of conclusion, two caveats are in order. Firstly, our 
findings cannot be taken to mean that China’s most prominent banks are efficient relative 
to other banks not included in the sample, such as foreign banks. No foreign banks 
operating in China were included in the sample because data for these banks was 
unavailable. Now that foreign banks have begun incorporating in China, separate data for 
their Chinese operations might soon be made publicly available and incorporating this into 
the analysis would add further value to the present paper. Theoretically, various 
competitive advantages and disadvantages can be cited for both domestic and foreign 
banks and whether one group is relatively more efficient awaits future empirical 
investigation. Secondly, our results are based on a sample of China’s banks that are almost 
certainly a better performing group than the population of China’s banks as a whole. If data 
were available for China’s other banks, which are many in number and together still 
account for more than 40 per cent of total banking sector assets, a much wider dispersion in 
efficiency levels would be expected. The fact that the findings indicate that BOB, China’s 
largest CCB and one of its most dynamic, has the scope to become substantially more 
efficient strongly suggests that many of China’s other banks lag even further behind and 
could well struggle to compete in the future. Thus, the Chinese Government and CBRC 
would be well advised to prepare contingency plans in order to manage such potential 
sources of banking sector instability in the future.    17
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